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Abstract
Given a ciphertext, is it possible to prove the deletion of the underlying plaintext? Since
classical ciphertexts can be copied, clearly, such feat is impossible using classical information
alone. In stark contrast to this, we show that quantum encodings allow such certified deletion.
More precisely, we show that it is possible to encrypt classical data into a quantum ciphertext
such that the recipient of the ciphertext can produce a classical string which proves to the
originator that the recipient has relinquished any chance of recovering the plaintext, should
the decryption key be revealed. Our scheme is feasible with current quantum technology: the
honest parties only require quantum devices for single-qubit preparation and measurements, and
is robust against noise in these devices. Furthermore, we provide an analysis that is suitable in
the finite-key regime.
1 Introduction
Consider the following scenario: Alice sends a ciphertext to Bob, but in addition, she wants to
encode the data in a way such that Bob can prove to her that he deleted the information contained
in the ciphertext. Such a deletion should prevent Bob from retrieving any information on the
encoded plaintext once the decryption key is revealed. We call this certified deletion.
Informally, this functionality stipulates that Bob should not be able to do the following two
things simultaneously: (1) Convince Alice that he has deleted the ciphertext; and (2) Given the
key, recover information about the encrypted message. To better understand this concept, consider
an analogy to certified deletion in the physical world: “encryption” would correspond to locking
information into a keyed safe, the “ciphertext” comprising of the locked safe. In this case, “deletion”
may simply involve returning the safe in its original state. This “deletion” is intrinsically certified
since, without the safe (and having never had access to the key and the safe at the same time), Bob
is relinquishing the possibility of gaining access to the information (even in the future when the key
may be revealed) by returning the safe. However, in the case that encryption is digital, Bob may
retain a copy of the ciphertext; there is therefore no meaningful way for him to certify “deletion”
of the underlying information, since clearly a copy of the ciphertext is just as good as the original
ciphertext, when it comes time to use the key to decrypt the data.
Quantum information, on the other hand, is known for its no-cloning principle [Die82, Par70,
WZ82], which states that quantum states cannot, in general, be copied. This quantum feature has
been explored in many cryptographic applications, including unforgeable money [Wie83], quantum
key distribution (QKD) [BB84], and more (for a survey, see [BS16]).
1.1 Summary of Contributions
In this work, we add to the repertoire of functionalities that are classically impossible, but that
quantum information allows to achieve with unconditional security. We give the first formal def-
inition of certified deletion encryption and certified deletion security. Moreover, we construct an
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encryption scheme which, as we demonstrate, satisfies these notions (in addition, our proofs are
applicable in the finite-key regime). Furthermore, our scheme is technologically simple since it
can be implemented by honest parties who have access to rudimentary quantum devices (that is,
they only need to prepare single-qubit quantum states, and perform single-qubit measurements);
we also show that our scheme is robust against noise in these devices. We now elaborate on these
contributions.
1.1.1 Definitions
Our first contribution is in the area of definitions (see Section 3). We build on the quantum
encryption of classical messages (QECM) framework [BL19] in order to explicate our notion of
encryption (for simplicity, our work is restricted to the single-use, private-key setting). Here, we
specify both a decryption key and an auxiliary key : The decryption key is used for decrypting
a ciphertext, whereas both the decryption and auxiliary keys are used for encryption. To the
QECM, we add a delete circuit, used by Bob if he wishes to delete his ciphertext and generate a
corresponding verification state, and a verify circuit, which uses both the auxiliary and decryption
keys, and is used by Alice to determine whether Bob really deleted the ciphertext.
Next, we define the notion of certified deletion security for a QECM scheme (See Fig. 1 and
Definition 3.5). The starting point for this definition is the well-known indistinguishability exper-
iment, this time played between an adversary A = (A0,A1,A2) and a challenger. After running
the Key Generation procedure, the adversary A0 submits an n-bit plaintext msg0 to the challenger.
Based on a random bit b, the challenger either encrypts msg0 or a dummy plaintext 0
n, and sends
the ciphertext to A1. The adversary A1 then produces a candidate “deletion certificate”, y. Next,
the decryption key is sent to the adversary A2, who produces a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. A scheme is
deemed secure if the probability that both y is accepted and b = b′ is negligibly close to 12 . We note
that certified deletion security does not necessarily imply indistinguishability, and hence these two
properties are defined and proved separately.
KeyGen
kaux
kdec
Encb
kaux
kdec
Ver ok
A0
msg0
A1
y
kdec A2 b′
Figure 1: Schematic representation of the security notion for certified deletion security. The game
is parametrized by b ∈ {0, 1} and Enc0 outputs an encryption of 0n while Enc1 encrypts its input,
msg0. An adversary A = (A0,A1,A2) wins the game if the verification output is ok and b′ = b
1.1.2 Scheme
In Section 4, we present our scheme. Our encoding is based on the well-known Wiesner encod-
ing [Wie83]. Informally, the message is encoded by first generating m random Wiesner states, |r〉θ
(r, θ ∈ {0, 1}m) (for notation, see Section 2.1). We let r|I be the substring of r where qubits are
encoded in the computational basis, and we let r|I¯ be the remaining substring of r (where qubits
are encoded in the Hadamard basis). Then, in order to create a proof of deletion, Bob measures
the entire ciphertext in the Hadamard basis. The result is a classical string, and Alice accepts
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the deletion if all the bits corresponding to positions encoded in the Hadamard basis are correct
according to r|I¯ . As for the message msg, it is encoded into x′ = msg ⊕ H(r|I) ⊕ u, where H
is a two-universal hash function and u is a fresh, random string. The use of the hash function is
required, intuitively, in order to prevent that partial information retained by Bob could be useful
in distinguishing the plaintext, whereas the random u is used to guarantee security in terms of an
encryption scheme. Robustness of the protocol is achieved by using an error correcting code and
including an encrypted version of the error syndrome. We note that while our definitions do not
require it, our scheme provides a further desirable property, namely that the proof of deletion is a
classical string only.
1.1.3 Proof
In Section 5, we present the security analysis of our scheme and give concrete security parameters
(Theorem 5.11 and its proof). First, the fact that the scheme is an encryption scheme is relatively
straightforward; it follows via a generalization of the quantum one-time pad (see Section 5.1). Next,
correctness and robustness (Section 5.2) follow from the properties of the encoding and of the error
correcting mechanism.
Next, the proof of security for certified deletion has a number of key steps. First, we apply the
security notion of certified deletion (Definition 3.5) to our concrete scheme (Scheme 4.1). This yields
a “prepare-and-measure” security game (see Game 5.3). However, for the purposes of the analysis,
it is convenient to consider instead an entanglement-based game (this is a common proof technique
for quantum protocols that include the preparation of random states [LC99, SP00]). In this game
(Game 5.4), the adversary, Bob, creates an initial entangled state, from which Alice derives (via
measurements in a random basis θ of her choosing) the value of r ∈ {0, 1}m. Interestingly, we
show that without loss of generality, in this game, Bob can produce the proof of deletion, y, before
he receives any information from Alice (this is due, essentially, to the fact that the ciphertext is
uniformly random from Bob’s point of view). Averaging over Alice’s choice of basis θ, we arrive at
a very powerful intuition: in order for Bob’s probability of creating an acceptable proof of deletion
y (i.e., he produces a string, where the positions corresponding to θ = 1 match with r|I¯) to be
high, he must unavoidably have a low probability of correctly guessing r|I . The above phenomenon
is embodied in the following entropic uncertainty relation for smooth entropies [TR11, TLGR12],
where we consider the scenario of Eve preparing a tripartite state ρABE , with Alice, Bob and Eve
receiving the A, B and E systems, respectively (here, A and B contain n qubits). Next, Alice
either measures all of her qubits in the computational basis to obtain string X, or she measures all
of her qubits in the Hadamard basis to obtain string Z, whereas Bob measures his qubits in the
Hadamard basis to obtain Z ′. We then have the relation:
Hǫmin(X | E) +Hǫmax(Z | Z ′) ≥ n, (1)
In the above, ǫ ≤ 0 is a smoothing parameter which represents a probability of failure, and the
smooth min-entropyHǫmin(X | E) characterizes the average probability that Eve guessesX correctly,
using her optimal strategy, and given her quantum register E, while the smooth max-entropy,
Hǫmax(Z | Z ′) corresponds to the number of bits that are needed in order to reconstruct Z from Z ′,
up to a failure probability ǫ (for details, see Section 2.4).
Our proof technique thus consists in formally analysing the entanglement-based game and ap-
plying the appropriate uncertainty relation in the spirit of the one above. Finally, we combine the
bound on Bob’s min-entropy with a universal2 hash function, which, together with the Leftover
Hashing Lemma of [Ren05], are used to prove indistinguishability between the cases b = 0 and
b = 1 after Alice has been convinced of deletion.
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1.2 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the first use of a quantum encoding to certify that a ciphertext is
completely “returned” was developed by Unruh [Unr14] in the context of revocable timed-release
encryption: in this case, the revocation process is fully quantum. Fu and Miller [FM18] gave the
first evidence that quantum information could be used to prove deletion of information, and that
this could be verified using classical interaction only: they showed that, via a two-party nonlocality
game (involving classical interaction), Alice can become convinced that Bob has deleted a single-
bit ciphertext (in the sense that the deleted state is unreadable even if Bob were to learn the
decryption key). Their results are cast in the device-independent setting (meaning that security
holds against arbitrarily malicious quantum devices). Further related work (that is independent
from ours) by Coiteux-Roy and Wolf [CW19] touches on the question of provable deletion using
quantum encodings, but only provides a candidate scheme, which is then broken within the same
work—therefore leaving open the general question of certified deletion.
Relationship with Quantum Key Distribution. It can be instructive to compare our re-
sults to the ones obtained in the analysis of QKD [TL17]. Firstly, our adversarial model appears
different, since in certified deletion, we have one honest party (Alice, the sender) and one cheat-
ing party (Bob, the receiver), whereas QKD involves two honest parties (Alice and Bob) and one
adversary (Eve). Next, the interaction model is different, since certified deletion is almost non-
interactive, whereas QKD involves various rounds of interaction between Alice and Bob. However,
the procedures and proof techniques for certified deletion are close to the ones used in QKD: we
use similar encodings into Wiesner states, similar privacy amplification and error correction, and
the analysis via an entanglement-based game uses similar entropic uncertainty relations, leading
to a security parameter that is very similar to the one in [TL17]. While we are not aware of any
direct reduction from the security of a QKD scheme to certified deletion, we note that, as part
of our proof technique, we manage to essentially map the adversarial model for certified deletion
to one similar to the QKD model, since we split the behaviour of our adversarial Bob into mul-
tiple phases: preparation of the joint state ρABE , measurement of a register B in a determined
basis, and finally bounding the advantage that the adversary has in simultaneously making Alice
accept the outcome of the measurement performed on B, and predicting some measurement out-
come on register A, given quantum side-information E. This scenario is similar to QKD, although
we note that the measurement bases are not chosen randomly, but are instead consistently in the
Hadamard basis (for Bob’s measurement), and Eve’s challenge is to predict Alice’s measurement in
the computational basis only (this situation is reminiscent of the single-basis parameter estimation
technique [TL17, PLWC16]).
1.3 Applications and Open Questions
While the main focus of this work is on the foundations of certified deletion, we can nevertheless
envisage potential applications, which we briefly discuss below (we leave the formal analyses for
future work).
Protection against data retention. In 2016, the European Union adopted a regulation on the
processing and free movement of personal data [The16]. Included is a clause on the “right to be
forgotten”: a person should be able to have their data erased whenever its retention is no longer
necessary. Certified deletion encryption might help facilitate this scenario in the following way: if a
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party were to provide their data to an organization via a certified deletion encryption, the organiza-
tion would be able to certify deletion of the data using the deletion circuit included in the scheme.
Encryption with classical revocation. The concept of ciphertext revocation allows a recipient
to provably return a ciphertext (in the sense that the sender can confirm that the ciphertext is
returned, and that the recipient will not be able to decrypt, even if the decryption key is leaked in
the future); such a functionality is unachievable with classical information alone, but is known to
be achievable using quantum ciphertexts [Unr14]. In a sense, our contribution is an extension of
revocation, since from the point of view of the recipient, whether quantum information is deleted
or returned, the end result is similar: the recipient is unable to decrypt, even given the decryption
key. Our scheme, however, has the advantage of using classical information only for the deletion.
As a use case for classical revocation, consider a situation where Bob loans Alice an amount of
money. Alice agrees to pay back the full amount in time T plus 15 percent interest if Bob does
not recall the loan within that time. To implement this scheme, Alice uses a certified deletion
encryption scheme to send Bob an encrypted cheque, and schedules her computer to send Bob
the key at time T . If Bob wishes to recall the loan within time T , he sends Alice the deletion
string. Another possible application is timed-release encryption [Unr14], where the decryption key
is included in the ciphertext, but encoded in a classical timed-release encryption.
Everlasting Security. Using our quantum encoding, it may be possible to transform a long-term
computational assumption into a temporary one. That is, that a computational assumption would
need to be broken during a protocol, or else the security is information-theoretically secure as soon
as the protocols ends. This is called everlasting security [Unr13].
For example, consider the situation encountered in a zero-knowledge proof system for a Σ-
protocol (for instance, for graph 3-colouring [GMW91]): the prover commits to an encoding of an
NP-witness using a statistically binding and computationally concealing commitment scheme. The
verifier then randomly chooses which commitments to open, and the prover provides the information
required to open the commitment. If, in addition, we could encode the commitments with a scheme
that provides certified deletion, then the verifier could also prove that the unopened commitments
are effectively deleted. This has the potential of ensuring that the zero-knowledge property becomes
statistical as long as the computational assumption is not broken during the execution of the
proof system. This description assumes an extension of our certified deletion encoding to the
computational setting, and also somehow assumes that the verifier would collaborate in its deletion
actions (we leave for future work the formal statement and analysis). Nevertheless, since zero-
knowledge proofs are building blocks for a host of cryptographic protocols, certified deletion has
the potential to unleash everlasting security, which is highly desirable given steady progress in both
algorithms and quantum computers.
1.4 Outline
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is an introduction to concepts and
notation used in the rest of this work. Section 3 lays out the novel security definitions which appear
in this paper. Section 4 is an exposition of our main scheme, while Section 5 provides a security
analysis.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we outline certain concepts and notational conventions which are used throughout
the article. We assume that the reader has a basic familiarity with quantum computation and
quantum information. We refer to [NC00] for further background.
2.1 Notation
We make use of the following notation: for a function f :X → R, we denote
E
x
f(x) =
1
|X|
∑
x∈X
f(x). (2)
We represent the Hamming weight of strings as the output of a Hamming weight function
ω: {0, 1}∗ → N. If x1, . . . , xn are strings, then we define (x1, . . . , xn) to be the concatenation of
these strings. Let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then, for any string x = (x1, . . . , xn) and any
subset I ⊆ [n], we use x|I to denote the string x restricted to the bits indexed by I. We call a
function η:N → R≥0 negligible if for every positive polynomial p, there exists an integer N such
that, for all integers n > N , it is true that η(n) < 1p(n) .
We let Q := C2 denote the state space of a single qubit, and we use the notation Q(n) := Q⊗n
for any n ∈ N. Let H be a Hilbert space. The set of unitary operators on H is denoted by U(H),
and the set of density operators on H is denoted by D(H). Through density operators, a Hilbert
space may correspond to a quantum system, which we represent by capital letters. The set of
diagonal density operators on H is denoted by D(H)—the elements of this set represent classical
states. Discrete random variables are thus modeled as finite-dimensional quantum systems, called
registers. A register X takes values in X . A density operator |x〉 〈x| will be denoted as |x〉〈x|.
We employ the operator norm, which we define for a linear operator A:H → H′ between finite-
dimensional Hilbert spaces H and H′ as
‖A‖= sup{‖Av‖| v ∈ H, ‖v‖= 1}. (3)
Moreover, for two density operators ρ, σ ∈ D(H), we use the notation ρ ≤ σ to say that σ − ρ is
positive semi-definite.
In order to illustrate correlations between a classical register X and a quantum state A, we use
the formalism of a classical-quantum state:
ρXA =
∑
x∈X
PX(x) |x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρA|X=x, (4)
where PX(x) := Pr[X = x]ρ = Tr[|x〉〈x|X ρXA] and ρA|X=x is the state of A conditioned on the
event that X = x.
Let |xi〉〈xi| ∈ D(H) be classical states for integers i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then we use the
notation
|x1, x2, . . . , xn〉〈x1, x2, . . . , xn| := |x1〉〈x1| ⊗ |x2〉〈x2| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉〈xn| . (5)
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Let H ∈ U(Q) denote the Hadamard operator, which is defined by
|0〉 7→ |0〉+ |1〉√
2
, |1〉 7→ |0〉 − |1〉√
2
. (6)
For any strings x, θ ∈ {0, 1}n, we define∣∣∣xθ〉 = Hθ |x〉 = Hθ1 |x1〉 ⊗ Hθ2 |x2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hθn |xn〉 . (7)
States of the form
∣∣xθ〉 are here called Wiesner states in recognition of their first use in [Wie83].
We make use of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state [EPR35], defined as
|EPR〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉). (8)
We use x
$←− X to denote sampling an element x ∈ X uniformly at random from a set X. This
uniform randomness is represented in terms of registers in the fully mixed state which is, given a
d-dimensional Hilbert space H, defined as 1d1d, where 1d denotes the identity matrix with d rows.
For two quantum states ρ, σ ∈ D(H), we define the trace distance
‖ρ− σ‖Tr := 1
2
‖ρ− σ‖. (9)
The operational meaning of the trace distance is that two states α and β can be distinguished
through measurement with probability at most 12 + ‖α− β‖Tr.
We define purified distance, which is a metric on quantum states.
Definition 2.1 (Purified Distance). Let A be a quantum system. For two states ρA, σA, we define
the generalized fidelity,
F (ρA, σA) :=
(
Tr
[√√
ρAσA
√
ρA
]
+
√
1− Tr[ρA]
√
1− Tr[σA]
)2
, (10)
and the purified distance,
P (ρA, σA) :=
√
1− F (ρA, σA). (11)
2.2 Hash Functions and Error Correction
We make use of universal2 hash functions, first introduced by Carter and Wegman [CW79].
Definition 2.2 (Universal2 Hashing). Let H = {h:X → Z} be a family of functions. We say that
H is universal2 if Pr[H(x) = H(x
′)] ≤ 1|Z| for any two distinct elements x, x′ ∈ X , when H is chosen
uniformly at random from H.
Such families exist if |Z| is a power of two (see [CW79]). Moreover, there exist universal2
families of hash functions which take strings of length n as input and which contain 2O(n) hash
functions; therefore it takes O(n) bits to specify a hash function from such a family [MNWC81].
Thus, when we discuss communication of hash functions, we assume that both the sender and
the recipient are aware of the family from which a hash function has been chosen, and that the
transmitted data consists of O(n) bits used to specify the hash function from the known family.
In the context of error correction, we note that linear error correcting codes can generate
syndromes, and that corrections to a message can be made when given the syndrome of the correct
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message. This is called syndrome decoding. Therefore, we implicitly refer to syndrome decoding
of an [n, n− s]-linear code which handles codewords of length n and generates syndromes of length
s < n when we use functions synd: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}s and corr: {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}n, where
synd is a syndrome-generating function and corr is a string-correcting function. We also make
reference to the distance of an error correcting code, which is the minimum distance between
distinct codewords.
2.3 Quantum Channels and Measurements
Let A and B be two quantum systems, and let X be a classical register. A quantum channel
Φ:A → B is a completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map. A generalized measurement on
A is a set of linear operators {MxA}x∈X , where x ∈ X are potential classical outcomes, such that∑
x∈X
(MxA)
†(MxA) = 1A. (12)
A positive-operator valued measure (POVM) on A is a set of Hermitian positive semidefinite oper-
ators {MxA}x∈X , where x ∈ X are potential classical outcomes, such that∑
x∈X
(MxA) = 1A. (13)
We also represent measurements with CPTP maps such as MA→X , which map quantum states in
system A to classical states in register X using POVMs.
For two registers X and Y , if we have a function, f :X → Y then we denote by Ef :X → XY
the CPTP map
Ef [·] :=
∑
x∈X
|f(x)〉Y |x〉〈x|X · |x〉〈x|X 〈f(x)|Y . (14)
In this work, measurement of a qubit in our scheme will always occur in one of two bases: the
computational basis ({|0〉 , |1〉}) or the Hadamard basis ({|+〉 , |−〉}). Thus, for a quantum system A,
we notate these measurements as {Mθ,xA }x∈{0,1}, where x ∈ {0, 1} ranges over the possible outcomes,
and where θ ∈ {0, 1} determines the basis of measurement (θ = 0 indicates computational basis
and θ = 1 indicates Hadamard basis).
Let {MxA}x and {NyA}y be two POVMs acting on a quantum system A. We define the overlap
c({MxA}x, {NyB}y) := maxx,y ‖
√
Mx
√
Ny‖2∞. (15)
Wherever dealing with an m-qubit quantum system A, we define, for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
ci := c
(
{M0,xAi }x, {M
1,y
Ai
}y
)
. (16)
We assume our measurements are ideal. Therefore,
ci =
∥∥∥∥(1 00 0
)(
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
)∥∥∥∥2
∞
=
∥∥∥∥(1/2 1/20 0
)∥∥∥∥2
∞
=
(
1√
2
)2
=
1
2
. (17)
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2.4 Entropic Uncertainty Relations
The purpose of entropy is to quantify the amount of uncertainty an observer has concerning the
outcome of a random variable. Since the uncertainty of random variables can be understood in
different ways, there exist different kinds of entropy. Key to our work are min- and max-entropy,
first introduced by Renner and Ko¨nig [Ren05, KRS09], as a generalization of conditional Re´nyi
entropies [Re´n61] to the quantum setting. Min-entropy, for instance, quantifies the degree of
uniformity of the distribution of a random variable.
Definition 2.3 (Min-entropy). Let A and B be two quantum systems. For any bipartite state
ρAB , we define
Hmin(A | B)ρ := sup{ξ ∈ R | ∃ state σB such that ρAB ≤ 2−ξ1A ⊗ σB}. (18)
Max-entropy quantifies the size of the support of a random variable, and is here defined by its
dual relation to min-entropy.
Definition 2.4 (Max-entropy). Let A and B be two quantum systems. For any bipartite state
ρAB , we define
Hmax(A | B)ρ := −Hmin(A | C)ρ, (19)
where ρABC is any pure state with TrC [ρABC ] = ρAB, for some quantum system C.
In order to deal with finite-size effects, it is necessary to generalize min- and max-entropy to
their smooth variants.
Definition 2.5 (Smooth Entropies). Let A and B be two quantum systems. For any bipartite
state ρAB, and ǫ ∈
[
0,
√
Tr[ρAB ]
)
, we define
Hǫmin(A | B)ρ := sup
ρ˜AB
P (ρ˜AB,ρAB)≤ǫ
Hmin(A | B)ρ˜, (20)
Hǫmax(A | B)ρ := inf
ρ˜AB
P (ρ˜AB ,ρAB)≤ǫ
Hmax(A | B)ρ˜. (21)
It is of note that smooth entropies satisfy the following inequality, commonly referred to as the
data-processing inequality [TCR10].
Proposition 2.6. Let ǫ ≥ 0, ρAB be a quantum state, and E :D(HA) → D(HC) be a CPTP map.
Define σAC := (1D(HA) ⊗ E)(ρAB). Then,
Hǫmin(A | B)ρ ≤ Hǫmin(A | C)σ and Hǫmax(A | B)ρ ≤ Hǫmax(A | C)σ. (22)
We use the following uncertainty relation, introduced by Tomamichel and Renner [TR11], and
expanded upon in [Tom12]. It was originally understood in terms of its application to QKD, and
was used to prove the secrecy of the key in a finite-key analysis of QKD [TLGR12].
Proposition 2.7. Let ǫ ≥ 0, let ρACE be a tripartite quantum state and let {MxA}x∈X and {N zA}z∈Z
be two POVMs acting on A. Then
Hǫmin(X | C)σ +Hǫmax(Z | E)σˆ ≥ q, (23)
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where q = log 1c and c = maxx,z‖
√
Mx
√
Nz‖2∞. Moreover, σXCE = MA→X(ρACE) and σˆZCE =
MA→Z(ρACE) with maps
MA→X(·) = TrA
(∑
x∈X
〈x|X (Mx) · (Mx)† |x〉X
)
(24)
and
MA→Z(·) = TrA
(∑
z∈Z
〈z|Z (Nz) · (Nz)† |z〉Z
)
. (25)
We also use the Leftover Hashing Lemma, introduced by Renner [Ren05]. It is typically under-
stood in relation to the privacy amplification step of QKD. We state it in the form given in [TL17].
Proposition 2.8. Let ǫ ≥ 0 and σAX be a classical-quantum state, with X a classical register
which takes values on X = {0, 1}s. Let H be a universal2 family of hash functions from X to
Y = {0, 1}n. Let χY = 12n 1D(Y) be the fully mixed state, ρSH = 1|H|
∑
H∈H |H〉〈H|SH and ζAY SH =
TrX [Ef (σAX ⊗ ρSH )] for the function f : (x,H) 7→ H(x) be the post-hashing state. Then,
‖ζAY SH − χY ⊗ ζASH‖Tr≤
1
2
2−
1
2
(Hǫmin(X|A)σ−n) + 2ǫ. (26)
2.5 Statistical Lemmas
The following lemmas are required to bound a specific max-entropy quantity. They are both
proven in [TL17] as part of a security proof of finite-key QKD, and this line of thinking originated
in [TLGR12].
The following lemma is a consequence of Serfling’s bound [Ser74].
Lemma 2.9. Let Z1, . . . Zm be random variables taking values in {0, 1}. Let m = s + k. Let I
be an independent and uniformly chosen subset of [m] with s elements. Then, for ν ∈ [0, 1] and
δ ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
∑
i∈I
Zi ≤ kδ ∧
∑
i∈I¯
Zi ≥ s(δ + ν)
 ≤ exp(−2ν2sk2
m(k + 1)
)
. (27)
It will also be useful to condition a quantum state on future events. This is called “smoothing”.
The following lemma from [TL17] states that, given a classical-quantum state, there may exist a
nearby smooth state on which a certain event does not occur.
Lemma 2.10. Let ρAX be a classical-quantum state with X a classical register, and Ω:X → {0, 1}
be an event with Pr[Ω]ρ = ǫ < Tr[ρAX ]. Then there exists a classical-quantum state ρ˜AX with
Pr[Ω]ρ˜ = 0 and P (ρAX , ρ˜AX) ≤
√
ǫ.
2.6 Quantum Encryption and Security
Whenever an adversary A is mentioned, it is assumed to be quantum and to have unbounded
computational power, and we allow it to perform generalized measurements.
Considering that the scheme introduced in this paper is an encryption scheme with a quantum
ciphertext, we rely on the “quantum encryption of classical messages” framework developed by
Broadbent and Lord [BL19]. This framework describes an encryption scheme as a set of parame-
terized CPTP maps which satisfy certain conditions.
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Definition 2.11 (Quantum Encryption of Classical Messages). Let n be an integer. An n-quantum
encryption of classical messages (n-QECM) is a tuple of uniform efficient quantum circuits S =
(key, enc, dec) implementing CPTP maps of the form
• Φkeyλ :D(C)→ D(HK,λ),
• Φencλ :D(HK,λ ⊗HM )→ D(HT,λ), and
• Φdecλ :D(HK,λ ⊗HT,λ)→ D(HM ),
where HM = Q(n) is the plaintext space, HT,λ = Q(ℓ(λ)) is the ciphertext space, and HK,λ =
Q(κ(λ)) is the key space for functions ℓ, κ:N+ → N+.
For all λ ∈ N+, k ∈ {0, 1}κ(λ), and m ∈ {0, 1}n, the maps must satisfy
Tr
[
|k〉〈k|Φkey(1)
]
> 0⇒ Tr
[
|m〉〈m|Φdeck ◦ Φenck |m〉〈m|
]
= 1, (28)
where λ is implicit, Φenck is the CPTP map defined by ρ 7→ Φenc(|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρ), and we define Φdeck
analogously. We also define the CPTP map Φenck,0 :D(HM )→ D(HT,λ) by
ρ 7→ Φenck (|0〉〈0|) (29)
where 0 ∈ {0, 1}n is the all-zero bit string, and the CPTP map Φenck,1 :D(HM )→ D(HT,λ) by
ρ 7→
∑
m∈{0,1}n
Tr[|m〉〈m| ρ] · Φenck (|m〉〈m|). (30)
As part of the security of our scheme, we wish to ensure that should an adversary obtain a
copy of the ciphertext and were to know that the original message is one of two hypotheses, she
would not be able to distinguish between the hypotheses. We refer to this notion of security as
indistinguishable security. It is best understood in terms of a scheme’s resilience to an adversary
performing what we refer to as a distinguishing attack.
Definition 2.12 (Distinguishing Attack). Let S = (key, enc, dec) be an n-QECM. A distinguishing
attack is a quantum adversary A = (A0,A1) implementing CPTP maps of the form
• A0,λ:D(C)→ D(HM ⊗HS,λ) and
• A1,λ:D(HT,λ ⊗HS,λ)→ D(Q)
where HS,λ = Q(s(λ)) for a function s:N+ → N+.
Definition 2.13 (Indistinguishable Security). Let S = (key, enc, dec) be an n-QECM. Then we
say that S is indistinguishable secure if for all distinguishing attacks A there exists a negligible
function η such that
E
b
E
k←K
Tr
[|b〉〈b|A1,λ ◦ (Φenck,b ⊗ 1S) ◦A0,λ(1)] ≤ 12 + η(λ) (31)
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side, b ∈ {0, 1}, and Kλ is the random variable distributed on
{0, 1}κ(λ) such that
Pr[Kλ = k] = Tr
[
|k〉〈k|Φkeyλ (1)
]
. (32)
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3 Security Definitions
In this section, we introduce a new description of the certified deletion security notion. First,
however, we must augment our QECM framework to allow it to detect errors on decryption.
Definition 3.1 (Augmented Quantum Encryption of Classical Messages). Let n be an integer. Let
S = (key, enc, dec) be an n-QECM. An n-augmented quantum encryption of classical messages (n-
AQECM) is a tuple of uniform efficient quantum circuits Sˆ = (key, enc, d̂ec, where d̂ec implements
a CPTP map of the form
Φd̂ecλ :D(HK,λ ⊗HT,λ)→ D(HM ⊗Q). (33)
For all λ ∈ N+, k ∈ {0, 1}κ(λ) , and m ∈ {0, 1}n, the maps corresponding to the circuits must satisfy
Tr
[
|k〉〈k|Φkey(1)
]
> 0⇒ Tr
[
|m〉〈m| ⊗ |1〉〈1|Φd̂eck ◦ Φenck |m〉〈m|
]
= 1, (34)
where λ is implicit, Φenck is the CPTP map defined by ρ 7→ Φenc(|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρ), and we define Φdeck
analogously.
The extra qubit (which will be referred to as a flag), though by itself without any apparent
use, may serve as a way to indicate that the decryption process did not proceed as expected in any
given run. In the case of decryption without error, the circuit should output |1〉〈1|, and in the case
of decryption error, the circuit should output |0〉〈0|. This allows us to define a criterion by which
an AQECM might be robust against a certain amount of noise.
Since the original QECM framework will no longer be used for the rest of this paper, we
henceforth note that all further references to the QECM framework are in fact references to the
AQECM framework.
Definition 3.2 (Robust Quantum Encryption of Classical Messages). Let S = (key, enc, dec) be
an n-QECM. We say that S is ǫ-robust if, for all adversaries A implementing CPTP maps of the
form
A:D(HT,λ)→ D(HT,λ), (35)
and for two distinct messages m,m′ ∈ HM , we have that
Tr
[
|k〉〈k|Φkey(1)
]
> 0 =⇒ Tr
[∣∣m′〉〈m′∣∣⊗ |1〉〈1|Φdeck ◦ A ◦ Φenck |m〉〈m|] ≤ ǫ. (36)
In other words, a QECM is ǫ-robust if, under interference by an adversary, the event that
decryption yields a different message than was encrypted and that the decryption circuit approves
of the outcome is less than or equal to ǫ.
Our description takes the form of an augmentation of the QECM framework described in Definition 3.1.
Given a QECM with key k and encrypting message m, the certified deletion property should guar-
antee that the recipient, Bob, cannot do the following two things simultaneously:
• Make Alice, the sender, accept his certificate of deletion; and
• Given k, recover information about m.
Definition 3.3 (Certified Deletion Encryption). Let S = (key, enc, dec) be an n-QECM such that
• HK,λ = HK ′,λ ⊗ HK ′′,λ, where HK ′,λ = Q(κ′(λ)) is the decryption key space and HK ′′,λ =
Q(κ′′(λ)) is the auxiliary key space for functions κ′, κ′′:N+ → N+; and
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• for all λ ∈ N+, k = (k′, k′′) ∈ {0, 1}κ′(λ)+κ′′(λ), and m ∈ {0, 1}n, it must hold that
Tr
[
|k〉〈k|Φkey(1)
]
> 0⇒ Tr
[
|m〉〈m| ⊗ |1〉〈1|Φdec
(k′,0κ′′ )
◦ Φenck |m〉〈m|
]
= 1, (37)
where λ is implicit.
Let del and ver be efficient quantum circuits implemented by CPTP maps of the form
• Φdelλ :D(HT,λ)→ D(HD,λ)
• Φverλ :D(HK,λ ⊗HD,λ)→ D(Q)
where HD,λ = Q(d(λ)) for a function d:N+ → N+.
For all λ ∈ N+, k ∈ {0, 1}κ(λ), and m ∈ {0, 1}n, the maps must satisfy
Tr
[
|k〉〈k|Φkey(1)
]
> 0 =⇒ Tr
[
|1〉〈1|Φver ◦
(
|k〉〈k| ⊗
(
Φdel ◦ Φenck |m〉〈m|
))]
= 1 (38)
where λ is implicit.
We call the tuple S ′ = (key, enc, dec, del, ver) an n-certified deletion encryption (n-CDE).
Definition 3.4 (Certified Deletion Attack). Let S = (key, enc, dec, del, ver) be an n-CDE. A cer-
tified deletion attack is a quantum adversary A = (A0,A1,A2) implementing CPTP maps of the
form
• A0,λ:D(C)→ D(HM ⊗HS,λ),
• A1,λ:D(HT,λ ⊗HS,λ)→ D(HD,λ ⊗HS,λ ⊗HT ′,λ), and
• A2,λ:D(HK ′,λ ⊗HS,λ ⊗HT ′,λ)→ D(Q)
where HS,λ = Q(s(λ)) and HT ′,λ = Q(ℓ′(λ)) for functions s, ℓ′:N+ → N+.
We are now ready to define our notion of Certified Deletion Security. We refer the reader
to Section 1.1.1 for an informal explanation of the definition, and we recall that notation Φenck,b is
defined in Eq. (29).
Definition 3.5 (Certified Deletion Security). Let S = (key, enc, dec, del, ver) be an n-CDE. For any
fixed and implicit λ ∈ N+, we define the CPTP map Φverk :D(HD,λ)→ D(Q⊗HK ′,λ) by
ρ 7→ Φver(|k〉〈k| , ρ)⊗ ∣∣k′〉〈k′∣∣ . (39)
Then we say that S is η-certified deletion secure if for all certified deletion attacks A, there exists
a function η such that
E
b
E
k←K
Tr
[
(|1, b〉〈1, b|)(1 ⊗A2) ◦ (Φverk ⊗ 1ST ′) ◦ A1 ◦ (Φenck,b ⊗ 1S) ◦A0(1)
] ≤ 1
2
+ η(λ) (40)
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side, b ∈ {0, 1}, and Kλ is the random variable distributed on
{0, 1}κ(λ) such that
Pr[Kλ = k] = Tr
[
|k〉〈k|Φkeyλ (1)
]
. (41)
We say that S is certified deletion secure if there exists such a function η that is negligible.
13
Mθ,xA Measurement operator acting on system A with setting θ and outcome x
MI
A→X|SΘ Measurement map applied on the qubits of system A indexed by I, with setting SΘ,
and outcome stored in register X
λ Security parameter
n Length, in bits, of the message
m = κ(λ) Total number of qubits sent from encrypting party to decrypting party
k Length, in bits, of the string used for verification of deletion
s = m− k Length, in bits, of the string used for extracting randomness
τ = τ(λ) Length, in bits, of error correction hash
µ = µ(λ) Length, in bits, of error syndrome
θ Basis in which the encrypting party prepares her quantum state
δ Threshold error rate for the verification test
Θ Set of possible bases from which θ is chosen
Hpa Universal2 family of hash functions used in the privacy amplification scheme
Hec Universal2 family of hash functions used in the error correction scheme
Hpa Hash function used in the privacy amplification scheme
Hec Hash function used in the error correction scheme
SΘ Seed for the choice of θ
SHpa Seed for the choice of the hash function used in the error correction scheme
SHec Seed for the choice of the hash function used in the privacy amplification scheme
synd Function that computes the error syndrome
corr Function that computes the corrected string
Table 1: Overview of nomenclature used in Section 4 and Section 5
4 Constructing an Encryption Scheme with Certified Deletion
Scheme 4.1 aims to exhibit a prepare-and-measure n-CDE with indistinguishable security and cer-
tified deletion.
Scheme 4.1 (Noise-Tolerant Prepare-and-Measure Certified Deletion). Let n, λ, τ, µ,m = s + k
be integers. Let Θ = {θ ∈ {0, 1}m | ω(θ) = k}. Let both Hec := {h: {0, 1}s → {0, 1}τ } and
Hpa := {h: {0, 1}s → {0, 1}n} be universal2 families of hash functions. Let synd: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}µ
be an error syndrome function, let corr: {0, 1}n × {0, 1}µ → {0, 1}n be the corresponding function
used to calculate the corrected string, and let δ ∈ [0, 1] be a tolerated error rate for verification.
We define a noise-tolerant prepare-and-measure n-CDE by Circuits 1-5. This scheme satisfies both
Equation (37) and Equation (38). It is therefore an n-CDE.
We note that in Section 3, we allow for the general case of both an auxiliary and decryption
key — both keys are accessible to the encryption and verification circuit, but the decryption circuit
only has access to the decryption key. Furthermore, after the verification, only the decryption key
is revealed. This makes our definition more general, and our scheme makes use of this framework,
since the string r is in the auxiliary key only (otherwise, letting r be part of the decryption key
would clearly make certified deletion impossible, since correctness would follow without the quantum
portion of the ciphertext. However, we note that, strictly speaking, ver only requires the portion
q = r|I¯ of the auxiliary key, and that in fact the certified deletion property holds if we include q in
the decryption key. This means that the use of an auxiliary key is unnecessary in our scheme; we
have nevertheless chosen to include it for ease of presentation.
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Circuit 1: The key generation circuit key.
Input :None.
Output :An auxiliary key state ρ ∈ D(Q(m)) and a decryption key state
σ ∈ D(Q(m+ n+ µ+ τ)⊗Hpa ⊗ Hec)).
1 Sample r
$←− {0, 1}m.
2 Sample θ
$←− Θ.
3 Sample u
$←− {0, 1}n.
4 Sample d
$←− {0, 1}µ.
5 Sample e
$←− {0, 1}τ .
6 Sample Hpa
$←− Hpa.
7 Sample Hec
$←− Hec.
8 Output ρ = |r〉〈r| and σ = |θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec〉〈θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec|.
Circuit 2: The encryption circuit enc.
Input :A plaintext state |msg〉〈msg| ∈ D(Q(n)), an auxiliary key state |r〉〈r| ∈ D(Q(m)),
and a decryption key state
|θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec〉〈θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec| ∈ D(Q(m+ n+ µ+ τ)⊗Hpa ⊗ Hec).
Output :A ciphertext state ρ ∈ D(Q(m+ n+ τ + µ)).
1 Compute x = Hpa(r|I) where I = {i ∈ [m] | θi = 0}.
2 Compute p = Hec(r|I)⊕ d.
3 Compute q = synd(r|I)⊕ e.
4 Output ρ =
∣∣rθ〉〈rθ∣∣⊗ |msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q〉〈msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q|.
Circuit 3: The decryption circuit dec.
Input :A decryption key state
|θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec〉〈θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec| ∈ D(Q(m+ n+ µ+ τ)⊗Hpa ⊗ Hec) and a
ciphertext ρ⊗ |c, p, q〉〈c, p, q| ∈ D(Q(m+ n+ µ+ τ)).
Output :A plaintext state σ ∈ D(Q(n)) and an error flag γ ∈ D(Q).
1 Compute ρ′ = Hθ ρHθ.
2 Measure ρ′ in the computational basis. Call the result r.
3 Compute r′ = corr(r|I , q ⊕ e) where I = {i ∈ [m] | θi = 0}.
4 Compute p′ = Hec(r
′)⊕ d.
5 If p 6= p′, then set γ = |0〉〈0|. Else, set γ = |1〉〈1|.
6 Compute x′ = Hpa(r
′).
7 Output σ ⊗ γ = |c⊕ x′ ⊕ u〉〈c⊕ x′ ⊕ u| ⊗ γ.
Circuit 4: The deletion circuit del.
Input :A ciphertext ρ⊗ |c, p, q〉〈c, p, q| ∈ D(Q(m+ n+ µ+ τ)).
Output :A certificate string state σ ∈ D(Q(m)).
1 Measure ρ in the Hadamard basis. Call the output y.
2 Output σ = |y〉〈y|.
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Circuit 5: The verification circuit ver.
Input :An auxiliary key state |r〉〈r| ∈ D(Q(m)), a decryption key state
|θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec〉〈θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec| ∈ D(Q(m+ n+ µ+ τ)⊗Hpa ⊗ Hec), and a
certificate string state |y〉〈y| ∈ D(Q(m)).
Output :A bit.
1 Compute yˆ′ = yˆ|I¯ where I¯ = {i ∈ [m] | θi = 1}.
2 Compute q = r|I¯ .
3 If ω(q ⊕ yˆ′) < kδ, output 1. Else, output 0.
5 Security Analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis for Scheme 4.1: in Section 5.1, we show the security
of the scheme in terms of an encryption scheme, then, in Section 5.2, we show that the scheme is
correct and robust. Finally in Section 5.3, we show that the scheme is a certified deletion scheme.
5.1 Indistinguishable Security
In considering whether Scheme 4.1 is indistinguishable secure (Definition 2.13), one need only verify
that an adversary, given a ciphertext, would not be able to discern whether a known message was
encrypted.
Theorem 5.1. Scheme 4.1 is indistinguishable secure.
Proof. For any distinguishing attack A = (A0,A1), any state ρ = ρS⊗|msg〉〈msg| ∈ D(HS⊗Q(n)),
and where k = (r, θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec) ∈ {0, 1}m+n+µ+τ × Hpa × Hec is a key, we have that
E
k
(
1S ⊗ Enc1k
)
(ρ) =
1
2m+n+µ+τ |Hpa||Hec|
∑
k
ρS ⊗
∣∣∣rθ〉〈rθ∣∣∣⊗ |msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q〉〈msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q|
=
1
2m+n+µ+τ |Hpa||Hec|
∑
k
ρS ⊗
∣∣∣rθ〉〈rθ∣∣∣⊗ |x⊕ u, p, q〉〈x⊕ u, p, q|
= E
k
(
1S ⊗ Enc0k
)
(ρ),
where the second equality is due to the uniform distribution of both msg ⊕ x⊕ u and u.
5.2 Correctness
Thanks to the syndrome and correction functions included in the scheme, the decryption circuit is
robust against a certain amount of noise; that is, below such a level of noise, the decryption circuit
outputs Alice’s original message with high probability. This noise threshold is determined by the
distance of the linear code used. In particular, where ∆ is the distance of the code, decryption
should proceed normally as long as fewer than ⌊∆−12 ⌋ errors occur to the quantum encoding of r|I
during transmission through the quantum channel.
To account for greater levels of noise (such as may occur in the presence of an adversary), we
show that the error correction measures implemented in Scheme 4.1 ensure that errors in decryption
are detected with high probability. In other words, we show that the scheme is ǫrob-robust, where
ǫrob :=
1
2τ .
Recall that τ is the length of the error correction hash, and that µ is the length of the error
correction syndrome. Consider that Bob has received a ciphertext state ρB ⊗ |c, p, q〉〈c, p, q| ∈
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D(Q(m + n + µ + τ)) and a decryption key (θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec) ∈ Θ × {0, 1}n+µ+τ × Hpa × Hec.
Given θ, Bob learns I. This allows him to perform the following measurement on ρB:
MIB→Y (·) =
∑
y∈{0,1}s
|y〉Y
(
M0,yBI
)
·
(
M0,yBI
)†
〈y|Y (42)
The new register Y contains a hypothesis of the random string Alice used in generating c. Since
ρB was necessarily transmitted through a quantum channel, it may have been altered due to noise.
Bob calculates a corrected estimate: xˆ = corr(y, q⊕ e). Finally, he compares a hash of the estimate
with p ⊕ d, which is the hash of Alice’s corresponding randomness. This procedure is represented
by a function ec: {0, 1}s × {0, 1}µ × Hec → {0, 1} defined by
ec(x, y) =
{
0 if Hec(x) 6= y
1 else.
(43)
To record the value of this test, we use a flag F ec := ec(xˆ, p ⊕ d). It is very unlikely that both
F ec = 1 and the outcome of Bob’s decryption procedure is not equal to Alice’s originally intended
message. This is shown in the following proposition, the proof of which follows that of an analogous
theorem in [TL17].
Theorem 5.2. Where r ∈ {0, 1}m is the random string Alice samples in key generation, and
xˆ = corr(y, q ⊕ e),
Pr[Hpa(r|I) 6= Hpa(xˆ) ∧ F ec = 1] ≤ 1
2τ
. (44)
Proof.
Pr[Hpa(r|I) 6= Hpa(xˆ) ∧ F ec = 1] = Pr[Hpa(r|I) 6= Hpa(xˆ) ∧Hec(p⊕ d) = Hec(xˆ)] (45)
= Pr[Hpa(r|I) 6= Hpa(xˆ) ∧Hec(r|I) = Hec(xˆ)] (46)
≤ Pr[Hpa(r|I) 6= Hpa(xˆ) ∧Hec(r|I) = Hec(xˆ)] (47)
= Pr[r|I 6= xˆ ∧Hec(r|I) = Hec(xˆ)] (48)
= Pr[r|I 6= xˆ] Pr[Hec(r|I) = Hec(xˆ)] (49)
≤ Pr[Hec(r|I) = Hec(xˆ) | r|I 6= xˆ] (50)
≤ 1|Hec| (51)
=
1
2τ
.
5.3 Certified Deletion Security
We now prove certified deletion security of Scheme 4.1. Our technique consists in formalizing a
game (Game 5.3 that corresponds to the security definition (Definition 3.5) applied to Scheme 4.1.
Next, we develop an entanglement-based sequence of interactions (Game 5.4) which accomplish
the same task as in the previous Game (the formal proof that an upper bound on the winning
probability of Game 5.4 is an upper bound on the winning probability of Game 5.3 is postponed
until Section 5.4).
To begin, we describe a game which exhibits a certified deletion attack on Scheme 4.1, and
which thus allows us to examine whether the scheme has certified deletion security. In what follows,
the challenger represents the party who would normally encrypt the message, and the adversary A
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represents the recipient. The adversary sends the challenger a candidate message msg0 ∈ {0, 1}n
and Alice chooses, with uniform randomness, whether to encrypt 0n or msg0; the adversary’s task
is to guess which one has been encrypted.
Game 5.3 (Prepare-and-Measure Game). Let S = (key, enc, dec, del, ver) be an n-CDE with λ
implicit, and with circuits defined as in Scheme 4.1. Let A = (A0,A1,A2) be a certified deletion
attack. The game is parametric in b
$←− {0, 1}.
1. Run |msg0〉〈msg0|M ⊗ ρS ← A0(1). Generate
|θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec, r〉〈θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec, r|K ← Φkey. (52)
Denote
msg :=
{
0n if b = 0
msg0 if b = 1.
(53)
Compute∣∣∣rθ〉〈rθ∣∣∣
T
⊗ |msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q〉〈msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q|T
← Φenc(|θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec, r〉〈θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec, r|K ⊗ |msg〉〈msg|M ).
(54)
2. Run
|y〉〈y|D ⊗ ρ′S ⊗ ρT ′ ← A1(
∣∣∣rθ〉〈rθ∣∣∣
T
⊗ |msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q〉〈msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q|T ⊗ ρS). (55)
If |0〉〈0| ← Φver(|θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec, r〉〈θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec, r|K ⊗ |y〉〈y|D), (56)
then A loses the game. Else, the game continues.
3. Run ∣∣b′〉〈b′∣∣← A2(|θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec〉〈θ, u, d, e,Hpa,Hec|K ′ ⊗ ρ′S ⊗ ρT ′). (57)
If b′ = b, then A wins the game.
Per Definition 3.5, we say that Scheme 4.1 is certified deletion secure if the probability that A
wins Game 5.3 is bounded above by 12+η(λ), where λ is the security parameter and η is a negligible
function.
Instead of directly analyzing Game 5.3, we analyze a game wherein the parties use entanglement;
essentially, this allows us show to express the game in a format that is conducive for the analysis
that follows. Please note, as we will show in Section 5.4, the probability that Bob wins Game 5.3
is bounded above by the probability that Bob wins Game 5.4.
Game 5.4 (EPR Game). Alice is the sender, and Bob is the recipient and adversary. The game
is parametric in b
$←− {0, 1}.
1. Bob selects a string msg0 ∈ {0, 1}n and sends msg0 to Alice. Bob prepares a tripartite
state ρABB′ ∈ D(Q(3m)) where each system contains m qubits. Bob sends the A system to
Alice and keeps the systems B and B′. Bob measures the B system in the Hadamard basis
and obtains a string y ∈ {0, 1}m. Bob sends y to Alice.
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2. Alice samples θ
$←− Θ, u $←− {0, 1}n, d $←− {0, 1}µ, e $←− {0, 1}τ , Hpa $←− Hpa, and Hec $←− Hec.
She applies a CPTP map to system A which measures Ai according to the computational
basis if θi = 0 and the Hadamard basis if θi = 1. Call the result r. Let I = {i ∈ [m] | θi = 0}.
Alice computes x = Hpa(r|I), p = Hec(r|I)⊕d, and q = synd(r|I)⊕e. Alice selects a message:
msg =
{
0n if b = 0
msg0 if b = 1.
(58)
If y = r|I¯ , Alice sends (msg ⊕ x⊕ u, θ, u, d, e, p, q,Hpa,Hec) to Bob. If ω(y ⊕ r|I¯) ≥ kδ, Bob
loses the game. Otherwise, the game continues.
3. Bob computes∣∣b′〉〈b′∣∣ = E(ρB′⊗
|msg ⊕ x⊕ u,msg0, θ, u, d, e, p, q,Hpa,Hec〉〈msg⊕ x⊕ u,msg0, θ, u, d, e, p, q,Hpa,Hec|)
(59)
for some CPTP map E . If b′ = b, Bob wins the game. Otherwise, he loses the game.
Game 5.4 is intended to model a purified version of Game 5.3. Note that Bob’s measuremement
of B in the Hadamard basis is meant to mimic the del circuit of Scheme 4.1. Although it may seem
strange that we impose a limitation of measurement basis on Bob here, it is in fact no limitation
at all; indeed, since Bob prepares ρABB′ , he is in total control of the state that gets measured, and
hence may assume an arbitrary degree of control over the measurement outcome. Therefore, the
assumption that he measures in the Hadamard basis is made without loss of generality.
It may also appear that the adversary in Game 5.3 has more information when producing the
deletion string than Bob in Game 5.4. This, however, is not true, as the adversary in Game 5.3 has
only received information from Alice that appears to him to be uniformly random (as mentioned,
the statement is formalized later, in Section 5.4). In order to further the analysis, we assign more
precise notation for the maps described in Game 5.4.
Bob’s measurements. Measurement of Bob’s system B of m qubits in Step 1 is represented
using two CPTP maps: one acting on the systems in I, with outcome recorded in register Y ; and
one acting on the systems in I¯, with outcome recorded in W . Note, however, that Bob has no
access to θ, and therefore has no way of determining I. The formal separation of registers Y andW
is simply for future ease of specifying the qubits to which we refer.
Recall the definition of the measurements Mx,yB from Section 2.3.
The first measurement, where the outcome is stored in register Y , is defined by
MIB→Y (·) =
∑
y∈{0,1}s
|y〉Y
(
M1,yBI
)
·
(
M1,yBI
)†
〈y|Y (60)
and the second, where the outcome is stored in register W , is defined by
MI¯B→W (·) =
∑
w∈{0,1}k
|w〉W
(
M1,wB
I¯
)
·
(
M1,wB
I¯
)†
〈w|W , (61)
where M1,yBI :=
⊗
i∈IM
1,yi
Bi
, and the definition of M1,wB
I¯
is analogous.
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Alice’s measurements. We represent the randomness of Alice’s sampling using seed registers.
Thus, the randomness used for Alice’s choice of basis is represented as
ρSΘ =
1(
m
k
) ∑
θ∈Θ
|θ〉〈θ|SΘ . (62)
Similarly, Alice’s randomness for choice of a hash function for privacy amplification is represented
as
ρ
SHpa
=
1
|Hpa|
∑
h∈Hpa
|h〉〈h|
SHpa
. (63)
Recall that m = s+ k, where k is the weight of all strings in Θ. Measurement of Alice’s system
A of m qubits in Step 2 is represented using two CPTP maps: one acting on the systems in I,
with outcome recorded in register X (by definition, these qubits are measured in the computational
basis); and one acting on the systems in I¯, with outcome recorded in register V (by definition,
these qubits are measured in the Hadamard basis).
MIA→X|SΘ(·) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
x∈{0,1}s
|x〉X
(
M0,xAI ⊗ |θ〉〈θ|SΘ
)
·
(
M0,xAI ⊗ |θ〉〈θ|SΘ
)†
〈x|X ;
and the second measurement, where the outcome is stored in register V , is defined by
MI¯A→V |SΘ = (·)
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
v∈{0,1}k
|v〉V
(
M1,vA
I¯
⊗ |θ〉〈θ|SΘ
)
·
(
M1,vA
I¯
⊗ |θ〉〈θ|SΘ
)†
〈v|V ,
where M0,xAI :=
⊗
i∈IM
0,xi
Ai
and the definition of M1,vA
I¯
is analogous.
We also introduce a hypothetical measurement for the sake of the security analysis. Consider
the case where Alice measures all of her qubits in the Hadamard basis. In this case, instead of
MI
A→X|SΘ
, Alice would use the measurement
MIA→Z|SΘ(·) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
z∈{0,1}s
|z〉Z
(
M1,zAI ⊗ |θ〉〈θ|SΘ
)
·
(
M1,zAI ⊗ |θ〉〈θ|SΘ
)†
〈z|Z .
Each of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements commute with each other as they all act on distinct
quantum systems. We can thus define the total measurement map
MAB→VWXY |SΘ =MIA→X|SΘ ◦MI¯A→V |SΘ ◦MIB→Y ◦MI¯B→W . (64)
The overall post-measurement state is denoted σVWXY SΘ. We analogously define the hypothetical
post-measurement state σˆVWZY SΘ.
Alice’s verification: Alice completes the verification procedure by comparing the V register to
the W register. If they differ in less than kδ bits, then the test is passed. The test is represented
by a function comp: {0, 1}k × {0, 1}k → {0, 1} defined by
comp(v,w) =
{
0 if ω(v ⊕ w) ≥ kδ
1 else.
(65)
To record the value of this test, we use a flag F comp := comp(v,w).
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The import of the outcome of this comparison test is that if Bob is good at guessing Alice’s
information in the Hadamard basis, it is unlikely that he is good at guessing Alice’s information in
the computational basis. This trade-off is represented in the uncertainty relation of Proposition 2.7.
Note that we can define the post-comparison test state, since A|I is disjoint from A|I¯ and B|I
is disjoint from B|I¯ . The state is denoted τABVWSΘ|F comp=1.
The following proposition shows that in order to ensure that Bob’s knowledge of X is limited
after a successful comparison test, and receiving the decryption key, his knowledge about Alice’s
hypothetical Hadamard measurement outcome must be bounded below.
Proposition 5.5. Let ǫ ≥ 0. Then
Hǫmin(X ∧ F comp = 1|V WSΘB′)σ +Hǫmax(Z ∧ F comp = 1|Y )σˆ ≥ s. (66)
Proof. We apply Proposition 2.7 to the state τABVWSΘ|F comp=1. To do this, we equate C =
VWSΘB′ and E = SΘB. Using the measurement maps MA→X|SΘ and MA→Z|SΘ and apply-
ing Proposition 2.7 then yields
Hǫmin(X ∧ F comp = 1|V WSΘB′)σ +Hǫmax(Z ∧ F comp = 1|SΘB)τ ≥ s. (67)
We then apply the measurement map MB→Y |SΘ and discard SΘ. Finally, by Proposition 2.6, we
note that
Hǫmax(Z ∧ F comp = 1 | SΘB)τ ≤ Hǫmax(Z ∧ F comp = 1 | Y )σˆ, (68)
which concludes the proof.
In the spirit of [TL17], we provide an upper bound for the max-entropy quantity, thus estab-
lishing a lower bound for the min-entropy quantity.
Proposition 5.6. Letting ν ∈ (0, 1), we define
ǫ(ν) := exp
( −sk2ν2
m(k + 1)
)
. (69)
Then, for any ν ∈ (0, 12 − δ] such that ǫ(ν)2 < Pr[F comp = 1]σ = Pr[F comp = 1]σˆ,
Hǫ(ν)max(Z ∧ F comp = 1 | Y )σˆ ≤ s · h(δ + ν) (70)
where
h(x) := −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x). (71)
Proof. Define the event
Ω :=
{
1 if ω(Z ⊕ Y ) ≥ s(δ + ν)
0 else.
(72)
Using Lemma 2.9, we get that
Pr [F comp = 1 ∧ Ω]σˆ = Pr [ω(V ⊕W ) ≤ kδ ∧ ω(Z ⊕ Y ) ≥ s(δ + ν)]σˆ (73)
≤ ǫ(ν)2. (74)
Given the state σˆZY F comp=1, we use Lemma 2.10 to remove the possibility of Ω and arrive at the
smoothed state σ˜ZY F comp with Pr[Ω]σ˜ = 0 and
P (σˆZY F comp=1, σ˜ZY F comp) ≤ ǫ(ν). (75)
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Since Pr[F comp = 1]σ˜ = 1, we get that
Hǫ(ν)max(Z ∧ F comp = 1 | Y )σˆ ≤ Hmax(Z ∧ F comp = 1 | Y )σ˜ = Hmax(Z | Y )σ˜. (76)
Expanding this conditional max-entropy [Tom12, Sec. 4.3.2], we obtain
Hmax(Z | Y )σ˜ = log
 ∑
y∈{0,1}s
Pr[Y = y]σ˜2
Hmax(Z|Y )σ˜
 (77)
≤ max
y∈{0,1}s
Pr[Y=y]
σ˜
>0
Hmax(Z | Y = y)σ˜ (78)
≤ max
y∈{0,1}s
Pr[Y=y]
σ˜
>0
log |{z ∈ {0, 1}s: Pr[Z = z | Y = y]σ˜ > 0}| (79)
= max
y∈{0,1}s
log |{z ∈ {0, 1}s: Pr[Z = z ∧ Y = y]σ˜ > 0}| . (80)
Since Pr[Ω]σ˜ = 0, we have
|{z ∈ {0, 1}s: Pr[Z = z ∧ Y = y]σ˜ > 0}| ≤ |{z ∈ {0, 1}s:ω(z ⊕ y) < s(δ + ν)}| (81)
=
⌊s(δ+ν)⌋∑
γ=0
(
s
γ
)
. (82)
When δ + ν ≤ 1/2 (see [vLvdG12, Sec. 1.4]), we have that ∑⌊s(δ=ν)⌋γ=0 (sγ) ≤ 2s·h(δ+ν).
At this point, we use Proposition 2.8, the Leftover Hashing Lemma, to turn the min-entropy
bound into a statement about how close to uniformly random the string X˜ = Hpa(X) is from Bob’s
perspective. We name this final state ζX˜SF compE∧F comp=1 = TrX [Ef (σXSΘSHecF comp ⊗ ρSHpa )] for
the function f : (X,Hpa) 7→ Hpa(X). We compare this to the state χX˜ ⊗ ζSF compE∧F comp=1 where
χX˜ is the fully mixed state on X˜.
Proposition 5.7. Let ǫ(ν) be as defined in (69). Then for any ν ∈ (0, 12 − δ] such that ǫ(ν)2 <
Pr[F comp = 1]σ, we have
‖ζX˜SF compE∧F comp=1 − χX˜ ⊗ ζSF compE∧F comp=1‖Tr≤
1
2
2−
1
2
g(ν) + 2ǫ(ν), (83)
where g(ν) := s(1− h(δ + ν))− n.
Proof. By Proposition 5.6, we see that
Hǫ(ν)max(Z ∧ F comp = 1 | Y )σ ≤ s · h(δ + ν). (84)
Together, with Proposition 5.5, this means that
Hǫmin(X ∧ F comp = 1|V WSΘB′)σ ≥ sq, (85)
where q = 1− h(δ + ν). Finally, applying Proposition 2.8, we obtain the desired inequality.
For the case where ǫ(ν)2 ≥ Pr[F comp = 1]σ, we note that the trace distance ‖ζX˜SF compE∧F comp=1−
χX˜⊗ζSF compE∧F comp=1‖Tr is upper bounded by the trace of both states (Pr[F comp = 1]ζ). Therefore,
the inequalities Pr[F comp = 1]ζ ≤ ǫ(ν)2 ≤ ǫ(ν) grants us the following corollary.
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Corollary 5.8. For any ν ∈ (0, 12 − δ], the following holds:
‖ζX˜SF compE∧F comp=1 − χX˜ ⊗ ζSF compE∧F comp=1‖Tr≤
1
2
√
2−s(1−h(δ+ν))+n + 2ǫ(ν). (86)
Finally, we would like to translate this statement into a probability that Bob would win Game 5.4.
Let ζg
X˜SF compE∧F comp=1
be the state of ζX˜SF compE∧F comp=1 in the case that g ∈ {0, 1} was selected
at the beginning of Game 5.4.
Corollary 5.9. The probability that Bob wins Game 5.4 is less than or equal to
1
2
+ 2
(
1
2
√
2−s(1−h(δ+ν))+n + 2ǫ(ν)
)
. (87)
Proof.
‖ζ0
X˜SF compE∧F comp=1
− ζ1X˜SF compE∧F comp=1‖Tr (88)
≤ ‖ζ0
X˜SF compE∧F comp=1
− χX˜ ⊗ ζSF compE∧F comp=1‖Tr
+‖ζ1
X˜SF compE∧F comp=1
− χX˜ ⊗ ζSF compE∧F comp=1‖Tr
(89)
= 2
(
1
2
√
2−s(1−h(δ+ν))+n + 2ǫ(ν)
)
. (90)
The conclusion follows from the operational meaning of the trace distance (see Section 2).
5.4 Security Reduction
We now show that the security of Game 5.3 can be reduced to that of Game 5.4. In order to do
so, we construct a sequence of games starting at Game 5.3 and ending at Game 5.4. Each game
will be winnable by the adversary (or Bob) with a probability only less than or equal to that of the
subsequent game.
The first new game, G, deprives A1 of the classical portion of the ciphertext. In the second new
game, G′, instead of selecting r uniformly at random, m EPR pairs are prepared, with one half of
each being sent to the adversary, and the other half of each being measured in basis θ, yielding r.
In the third new game, G′′, the aforementioned measurement, and hence the determination of r, is
delayed until after running A1.
Proposition 5.10. The probability that A wins Game 5.3 is bounded above by the probability that
Bob wins Game 5.4.
Proof. The probability that A wins Game 5.3 is given by the following formula:
Pr
[
b = b′ ∧ |1〉〈1| ← Φver(ρK ⊗ |y〉〈y|D) | Game 5.3
]
. (91)
The probability that Bob wins Game 5.4 is given by the following formula:
Pr
[
b = b′ ∧ ω(y ⊕ r|I¯) < kδ | Game 5.4
]
. (92)
Let G be a game like Game 5.3 except that, in G, A1 does not have access to
|msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q〉〈msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q| .
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Then
Pr
[
b = b′ ∧ |1〉〈1| ← Φver(ρK ⊗ |y〉〈y|D) | Game 5.3
]
= Pr
[
b = b′ ∧ |1〉〈1| ← Φver(ρK ⊗ |y〉〈y|D) | G
]
,
(93)
because, from the perspective of A1 in Game 5.3, |msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q〉〈msg ⊕ x⊕ u, p, q| is uniformly
random. Let G′ be a game like G except that, in G′, instead of A1 being given
∣∣rθ〉〈rθ∣∣, m EPR
pairs are prepared, yielding quantum systems A and B, of which the adversary A1 is given B.
System A is measured in basis θ yielding a string r, and A1 then computes
|y〉〈y|D ⊗ ρ′S ⊗ ρT ′ ← A1(ρB ⊗ ρS). (94)
We show that, due to the measurement of system A, adversary A1 receives
∣∣rθ〉〈rθ∣∣, where r is
uniformly random. The post-measurement state, conditioned on the measurement of system A
yielding outcome r, will be equivalent to
|ψr〉 =
(
Hθ |r〉〈r|Hθ ⊗1m
)
|EPRm〉 (95)
=
(
Hθ⊗1m
)
(|r〉〈r| ⊗ 1m)
(
1m ⊗ Hθ
)
|EPRm〉 (96)
=
∑
r˜∈{0,1}m
1
2m/2
(
Hθ |r〉〈r| |r˜〉
)(
Hθ |r˜〉
)
(97)
=
1
2m/2
(
Hθ |r〉
)(
Hθ |r〉
)
(98)
=
1
2m/2
∣∣∣rθ〉⊗ ∣∣∣rθ〉 , (99)
which occurs with probability ‖|ψr〉 ‖2= 12m . Therefore,
Pr
[
b = b′ ∧ |1〉〈1| ← Φver(ρK ⊗ |y〉〈y|D) | G
]
= Pr
[
b = b′ ∧ |1〉〈1| ← Φver(ρK ⊗ |y〉〈y|D) | G′
]
. (100)
Let G′′ be a game like G′ except that, in G′′, instead of system A being measured before running
A1, system A is measured after. Then
Pr
[
b = b′ ∧ |1〉〈1| ← Φver(ρK ⊗ |y〉〈y|D) | G′
]
= Pr
[
b = b′ ∧ |1〉〈1| ← Φver(ρK ⊗ |y〉〈y|D) | G′′
]
,
(101)
because the measurement and A1 act on distinct systems, and therefore commute. G
′′ is like Game 5.4
except that, in the latter game, Bob is the party that prepares the state. Since allowing Bob to
select the initial state can only increase Bob’s chance of winning, it follows that
Pr
[
b = b′ ∧ |1〉〈1| ← Φver(ρK ⊗ |y〉〈y|D) | G′′
] ≤ Pr[b = b′ ∧ ω(y ⊕ r|I¯) < kδ | Game 5.4]. (102)
Theorem 5.11. Scheme 4.1 is certified deletion secure.
Proof. By Corollary 5.9, Bob can win Game 5.4 with at most a probability of
1
2
+ 2
(
1
2
√
2−s(1−h(δ+ν))+n + 2ǫ(ν)
)
. (103)
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By Proposition 5.10, this also serves as an upper bound for the probability that A wins Game 5.3.
Since Game 5.3 is a certified deletion attack for Scheme 4.1, we see that Scheme 4.1 is η-certified
deletion secure for
η(λ) = 2
(
1
2
√
2−(s(λ))(1−h(δ+ν))+n + 2exp
( −(s(λ))(k(λ))2ν2
(m(λ))((k(λ)) + 1)
))
, (104)
which is negligible for large enough functions s, k.
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